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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS ELIGIBLE
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IN WISCONSIN
RAMON A. KLITZKE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of meaningful access to the judicial branch of
government for parties aggrieved by the action or inaction of
administrative agencies is a basic tenet of the present adminis-
trative law system in this country. While vast areas of author-
ity have been consigned to the administrative branch of gov-
ernment, that branch has not yet been accorded complete au-
tonomy in all quasi-judicial matters.' Some would argue that
certain agencies have been delegated supreme power, 2 particu-
larly with respect to the routine functioning of those agencies.3
As autonomous as these agencies may appear, however, the
citizen wronged by an agency is not without recourse to a court
or to corrective legislative measures, even though such latter
measures may benefit only those citizens who may deal with
the agency in the future.'
The advent of a massive and complex administrative law
system in the United States made it incumbent upon the law
to develop a finely tuned mechanism to be used whenever nec-
essary for the judicial review of agency decisions.5 On the one
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. B.S. Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology, 1950; J.D. Indiana University, 1957; LL.M. New York University, 1958; Mem-
ber of the Wisconsin, Texas and New York Bars. Reporter for Government and Admin-
istrative Law Section of the Wisconsin Bar Association.
1. An interesting, recent Wisconsin case discussed legislative delegation of broad
authority to administrative agencies: State v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 77 Wis. 2d 126, 252 N.W.2d 353 (1977).
2. Statutory delegation of power to administrative agencies under broad standards
has been approved by the United States Supreme Court since the 1930's. See, e.g.,
Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930) ("just and reasonable"); New York
Cent. Secur. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932) ("public interest"); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 353 U.S. 421 (1920) ("unfair methods of competition").
3. In terms of quantity, promulgation of rules overshadows quasi-judicial matters.
The courts carefully scrutinize procedures by which rules are adopted by agencies.
Dane County v. Department of Health & Social Services, 79 Wis. 2d 323, 255 N.W.2d
539 (1977).
4. The Wisconsin court has approved broad statutory delegation of power under the
test of "sufficient standard." State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman,
196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928); Schmidt v. Department of Local Affairs & Dev.,
39 Wis. 2d 46, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968).
5. The Wisconsin legislature, joining those of other states, met this challenge by
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hand, it was recognized that many of the advantages of the
administrative system would be lost if judicial review became
a process by which the courts substituted their judgment for
that of the agencies on matters of both law and fact. On the
other hand, it became apparent that officers appointed to ad-
ministrative posts were indeed human, and error in judgment,
sometimes substantial, was not unknown. The law of judicial
review has thus become a law of compromise-an attempt to
balance the extremes of judicial constriction and judicial per-
missiveness. For example, a court might smile approvingly at
the diligent effort of an agency to apply its recognized expertise
to a technical problem requiring a technical solution,' but in
the very next case, the same court might recoil from any at-
tempt by the agency to usurp the historical and constitutional
mandate lodged only in the judicial branch of government.7
This article examines the working relationship between
courts and administrative agencies and attempts to discern the
type of administrative matter which courts will accept for re-
view. The forum for this analysis is Wisconsin and the focal
points are the supreme court's interpretation of the Wisconsin
Administrative Procedure and Review Act s and its attitude
toward agency decisions9 as evidenced in recent opinions.
]1. THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
It is the rare Wisconsin lawyer who will never have occasion
providing a procedure for review of administrative decisions. For a discussion of the
Wisconsin statute, see Hoyt, The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act, 1944 Wis.
L. REv. 214, 226-38.
6. See, e.g., Robinson v. Kunach, 76 Wis. 2d 436, 446, 251 N.W.2d 449, 453 (1977).
The court held that counties were not "agencies of the state" as meant by the Wiscon-
sin Environmental Protection Act in Wis. STAT. § 1.11(2)(c) (1975). The administrative
action in question had not included counties within the term, "agencies of the state."
7. In Department of Revenue v. Milwaukee Ref. Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 44, 257 N.W.2d
855 (1977), the court admitted that the agency had particular competence or expertise
in the subject matter but refused to defer to the agency's application of the law where
the court, in its opinion, was as competent as the agency to decide the question
involved. In Voight v. Washington Island Ferry Line, 79 Wis. 2d 333, 255 N.W.2d 545
(1977), the Public Service Commission was not allowed to reverse the finding of its
hearing examiner without specifying the evidence upon which it relied pursuant to
Wis. STAT. § 227.12 (1973).
8. Wis. STAT. §§ 227.01-.26 (1975).
9. The Wisconsin Legislature has, in the 1975 amendment to § 227.20, recognized
the need to emphasize the autonomy of the agencies. The Act now provides that the
court "shall affirm" unless grounds for reversal are specifically found. Wis. STAT. §
227.20(2) (1975).
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to utilize the law of administrative agencies. Many lawyers will
frequently practice administrative law, and many will practice
it exclusively. It is possible that lawyers may become so ena-
mored with the system or disenchanted with the judicial sys-
tem that administrative law will become an end in itself and
not a stepping stone in the progressive dispensation of legal
justice. It is not possible that the administrative system, even
if ignored in the practice of some of the older, staid areas of the
law, will ever wither. Indeed, administrative law is so firmly
entrenched in American jurisprudence that it is more likely to
seep into most areas of law so completely that the bright divid-
ing line between the administrative and judicial branches may
one day disappear.
To move from the agency to the court, at least at this point
in the development of law, is to move from one medium to
another. This is at once both a blessing and a curse. The lawyer
appealing the administrative decision can use the superior pos-
ition of the court not only to reverse that particular decision
but also to contract the power of the agency in future cases.
Sometimes the lawyer lives to regret this contraction if he must
argue the opposite side of the issue in the next case. In any
event, to appeal from the agency to the court is to advance to
a more formal, more authoritative, more respected tribunal. If
it is important to preserve and protect the sanctity of judicial
adjudication of most legal matters then the two mediums must
remain discrete and rules of judicial review must be strong,
unambiguous, and perhaps even oppressive.
If, however, the growing autonomy of administrative agen-
cies continues, and if it is recognized that more judicial and
legislative decisions will have to be delegated to agencies, then
the rules of judicial review will soften. If the complete merger
of the administrative and judicial branches ever occurs, there
would be, in fact, no need for rules of review which contemplate
completely separate tribunals and the need to preserve the
judicial superiority will no longer exist.
III. STATUTORY AvAMiABITY OF JuDICIL REVIEW
In this country, the propriety of judicial review of adminis-
trative agency action has never been questioned."° This is to be
10. Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 75
(1941).
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expected under a system of law in which most legislative action
is subject to judicial constitutional review. The question for
discussion is what type of agency action is to be tested in the
courts. Assuming that the proper parties are before the court,
the scope of the court's reviewing power is in issue" and three
questions must be resolved:
(a) Has proper timing of the action for review l een
observed? (This includes the issue of ripeness.)
(b) What is the statutory or other authority for judicial
review?
(c) Has the appellant chosen the proper form of action for
review?
The second question, the authority for judicial review will
be addressed first. While historically there was a need to rely
upon constitutional power to review administrative action,
ample authority for most species of judicial review has now
been provided in statutory form.
The present Wisconsin statute defining reviewable admin-
istrative orders is an attempt to eliminate some of the ambigu-
ity of its predecessor. In one respect there seems to be a con-
traction of the right to review, but in another respect the stat-
ute expands the right. The statute reads in part as follows:
227.15 Judicial Review; orders reviewable. Administra-
tive decisions, which adversely affect the substantial inter-
ests of any person, whether by action or inaction, whether
affirmative or negative in form, . . . shall be subject to judi-
cial review as provided in this chapter. 2
The statute which this replaced allowed judicial review of
"[a]dministrative decisions, which directly affect the legal
rights, duties or privileges of any person, whether affirmative
or negative in form."' 3
The substitution of "adversely affect" for "directly affect"
and "substantial interests" for "legal rights, duties or privi-
leges" cannot be said to be the ultimate solution to all prob-
lems arising in the determination of which administrative deci-
sions are subject to judicial review, but it is likely that some
11. For a discussion on the limited scope of review of an agency decision, see
Wisconson's Environmental Decade v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d 161, 170, 255
N.W.2d 917, 923 (1977).
12. Wis. STAT. § 227.15 (1975), as amended by 1975 Wis. Laws, ch.414.
13. Wis. STAT. § 227.15 (1973).
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degree of clarity has been achieved.
Although it may be debatable, the use of the term,
"adversely affect," narrows the class of persons who are eligible
to appeal administrative decisions. One may be "directly" af-
fected by a decision, although not "adversely" affected. The
converse, however, is always true: one "adversely" affected is
always "directly" affected. To limit the number of persons who
may appeal an administrative decision may be progress, de-
pending upon the viewpoint of the observer. At any rate, it is
a recognition that administrative agencies are to be accorded
further power of control over their decisions."
The effect Of the substitution of "substantial interests" for
"legal rights, duties and privileges" is, on its face, less clear.
This term standing alone would expand the class of persons
eligible to appeal. Were it not for the fact that these appellants
must also be adversely affected, the class might be quite large,
indeed. "Substantial" would be a term permitting a wide vari-
ety of interpretations if it were without precedent in adminis-
trative law. However, it has a familiar ring, and the develop-
ment of the well-known substantial evidence rule 5 limiting the
scope of judicial review of agency decisions is witness to the
proposition that the term as used in section 227.15 may soon
acquire a more precise meaning. This, at least, is the hope of
administrative lawyers and of the Judicial Council that drafted
the bill containing the term. 6
14. No attempt will made at this point to analyze the all-important term,
"decision," although it may be observed in passing that the term is not to be read as
broadly as might be suggested. C & S Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 106
(1948). Furthermore, the legislature intended to liberalize the class of parties having
standing for review purposes. See text accompanying notes 51-56, infra.
15. The substantial evidence rule must be applied by the reviewing court to the
agency's action: "The court shall, however, set aside agency action or remand the case
to the agency if it finds that the agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is
not supported by substantial evidence in the record." Wis. STAT. § 227.20 (6) (1975).
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It does not include
the idea of weight of the evidence. Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
253 Wis. 397, 405-06, 34 N.W.2d 238, 242 (1948).
16. In 1973 the Wisconsin Judicial Council appointed an Administrative Law Com-
mittee to consider improvements to ch. 227 and to create a Municipal Administrative
Procedures Act. The explanatory notes adopted by the Council to accompany the text
of the assembly bill insist that the revised language is intended to follow the direction
of the cases on standing for review in federal courts. The term, "substantial interests,"
was substituted for "legal rights, duties or privileges" to broaden the coverage of
particular statutory sections. The substitution was made throughout the Act. See, e.g.,
1978]
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IV. JUDICIAL POSTURE ON AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW
A. Timeliness of Judicial Review
Whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court will continue its
conservative attitude toward the availability of judicial review
of administrative decisions, in light of the apparent intent of
the drafters of the revised statute to liberalize review, is a diffi-
cult question to answer. The starting point in the analysis
must, of necessity, be the case of Pasch v. Department of
Revenue.17
The Pasch case involved the reviewability of an income tax
assessment, the merits of which were still pending before the
Tax Appeals Commission when the taxpayer petitioned the
circuit court for review of a Commission order upholding the
jurisdiction of the Commission. The court observed that the
order issued by the Commission, from which the Commission
would proceed to a hearing upon the merits of the controversy,
could more properly be called an interlocutory order rather
than a final order, but that neither the form of the order nor
the label of "final" or "interlocutory" necessarily determined
its character as to reviewability.' 8 It was held that the circuit
court had no jurisdiction to review the subject matter because,
in the language of the statute, the order did not "directly affect
the legal rights, duties or privileges" of the appellant. Further-
more, the court could not approve of the taxpayer's selection
of one of several issues pending before the Commission, present
it to the Commission in the form of a motion, and thereby
achieve a separate review and appeal thereon.'9 The court
Wis. STAT. §§ 227.01(2), (6) and (8) (1975). The term, "adversely affect," was substi-
tuted for, "directly," to avoid the semantic quibbling over standing through public
interest groups. Thus, the intent was to broaden coverage. 1975 Wis. Assembly Bill 163,
Judicial Council Note, enacted in 1975 Wis. Laws, ch.414.
17. 58 Wis. 2d 346, 206 N.W.2d 157 (1973). The Pasch case was followed and was
controlling in State v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 65 Wis. 2d 624, 631,
223 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1974); was followed in State ex rel. General Elec. Co. v. Depart-
ment of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 68 Wis. 2d 688, 694, 229 N.W.2d 597, 601
(1975); was cited in Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
69 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 230 N.W.2d 243, 247 (1975) and in City of West Allis v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 268, 240 N.W. 2d 416, 417 (1976). Pasch
was quoted at length in Friends of the Earth v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 78 Wis. 2d 388,
404-05, 254 N.W. 2d 299, 305 (1977).
18. 58 Wis. 2d at 356, 206 N.W.2d at 162. Judicial review of a similar type of
situation, interim rate orders, is discussed in Friends of the Earth v. Public Service
Comm'n, 78 Wis. 2d 388, 403-11, 254 N.W. 2d 299, 305-08 (1977).
19. 58 Wis. 2d at 358, 206 N.W.2d at 163.
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noted that review was strictly limited by statute; it was unwill-
ing to review the "jurisdictional facts" of the Department's
failure to act upon the taxpayer's application for abatement
within the statutory six month period.2"
Similarly, in State v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission,"' a case relating to the grievance of a discharged
employee, there was such a commingling of two issues before
the hearing examiner that motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment were held to be premature because there had not yet
been an exhaustion of administrative remedies by the em-
ployee complainant.22 Relying on Pasch, the court would not
approve the circuit court's review of the issue of whether the
collective bargaining agreement provided the exclusive griev-
ance procedure, even though the employer vigorously argued
that this would require a full hearing before the Commission
just to determine that the employee should have submitted to
arbitration. The hearing examiner had decided that the issues
of (1) discharge without just cause and (2) union breach of its
duty of fair representation of the employee were not separable
and had therefore denied the employer's motion as premature.
The employer, of course, sought to have the second issue de-
cided at once, so as to avoid a determination of the merits of
the discharge before the Commission. The result reached by
the court was defended as conducive to the avoidance of inter-
ruption of proceedings before administrative agencies and con-
stant shifting back and forth between the agencies and the
courts. 21 The court again refused to review the threshold juris-
dictional issue separately.
The Pasch philosophy was embraced and reinforced in
State ex rel. General Electric Co. v. Department of Industry,
Labor & Human Relations.24 This case is typical of the prob-
lems faced by the courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
20. The leading case adopting the "jurisdictional facts" doctrine is Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). But the Crowell case is probably no longer the law. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 539 (3d ed. 1972).
21. 65 Wis. 2d 624, 223 N.W.2d 543 (1974).
22. Id. at 634-36, 223 N.W.2d at 548-50.
23. Id. at 637, 223 N.W.2d at 550. In a similar vein, the court held, in City of West
Allis v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 268, 240 N.W.2d 416
(1976), that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to review an order of the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission directing an election for collective bargaining pur-
poses because of statutory constrictions in the Wisconsin Employment Relations Act.
24. 68 Wis. 2d 688, 229 N.W.2d 597 (1975).
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tion: the determination of whether the court or the agency
should make the initial decision.25 The General Electric Com-
pany sought a writ of prohibition to stop the Equal Rights
Division from acting further upon a complaint by a female
employee of sex discrimination in promotion and compensation
practices. The employer argued that the agency lacked juris-
diction because of a defective complaint, mootness, failure to
pursue union remedy (which was similar to the argument made
in State v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission),
laches and statute of limitations.2" Again in this case, the argu-
ment was pressed that the party brought before the adminis-
trative tribunal by the complainant would be subjected to
undue hardship in the expenditure of time and funds in defend-
ing itself at a hearing which the agency had no power to con-
duct in the first instance, the matter being within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board." Although
the court admitted that some of the arguments of the employer
may have had some merit, it concluded that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act would provide adequate judicial review at
a later stage in the proceedings and appeal to the circuit court
was premature at this time. 8
The particular issue of the Pasch case relating to the review-
ability of an interlocutory order by an agency was revisited in
Friends of the Earth v. Public Service Commission.29 This re-
cent reaffirmance of limited judicial review of agency orders is
further evidence that the Wisconsin Court will continue to be
reluctant to interfere with administrative processes. The Pasch
case was quoted extensively and, after noting that neither sec-
tion 227.15 nor the statute covering judicial review of orders of
the Public Service Commission expressly restricts its operation
to final administrative orders, the court observed that "it is
settled that not all decisions, orders or determinations which
might fit within a literal reading of the statutes are subject to
judicial review." 0 Review was denied because of the Public
Service Commission's willingness to modify the order in ques-
tion.3 1
25. See generally, DAvis, ADmnNISTRATIV. LAW TREATISE §§ 19.01-.09 (1958).
26. 68 Wis. 2d at 689, 229 N.W.2d at 598.
27. Id. at 694, 229 N.W.2d at 601.
28. Id. at 695, 229 N.W.2d at 601.
29. 78 Wis. 2d 388, 254 N.W.2d 299 (1977).
30. Id. at 404, 254 N.W.2d at 305.
31. Id. at 415, 254 N.W.2d at 310.
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Closely related to the question of review of interim agency
actions is the time-honored doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies. It can be seriously argued that this is merely
another label for the same type of issues already discussed. The
most recent case involving this issue is Nodell Investment
Corp. v. City of Glendale,3 2 in which property owners brought
a declaratory judgment action to declare certain deeds null and
void. The plaintiffs had been required to convey a strip of land
to the city as a condition for the approval of the construction
of a bowling alley. When the city began purchasing additional
frontage property, the plaintiffs, who had been required to con-
vey their land gratuitously, brought the action, although they
had not challenged the condition before the board of appeals.
The court noted that the statute provided the exclusive remedy
in this situation and drew an analogy between the exhausion
rule and the rule that appeal from a trial court may be taken
only from a final judgment.3 Having realized that there are
some exceptions to the final judgment appeal rule, the court
quickly observed that exhaustion is not always required. The
exceptions are:
(1) The agency has no jurisdiction to act in the matter.
(2) The administrative action is fatally void.
(3) A question of law is involved in which the administra-
tive agency's expertise is not an important factor.
(4) A substantial constitutional question is involved.
(5) The administrative remedy is inadequate to avoid irre-
parable harm.
(6) Recourse to the administrative agency would be a futile
or useless act. 4
Because this case did not involve declaring an ordinance in-
valid, the administrative machinery provided by statute
should have been utilized and the plaintiffs were precluded
from circumventing them by the process of declaratory judg-
ment. It should be noted that the Wisconsin Administrative
Procedure Act specifically provides for declaratory judgment
proceedings where the validity of a rule is at issue if the rule
interferes with or impairs the legal rights and privileges of a
32. 78 Wis. 2d 416, 254 N.W.2d 310.
33. Id. at 424, 254 N.W.2d at 315.
34. Id. at 425 n.12, citing DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 20.04, 20.05,
20.07, 20.10 (1958).
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plaintiff.35 However, in Nodell Investment, only the application
of a rule was challenged, not the rule itself.
The inappropriateness of declaratory relief was also empha-
sized in the recent case of Kosmatka v. Department of Natural
Resources.3 6 The plaintiffs failed to seek judicial review of a
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) order which denied
them a permit to construct a U-shaped enclosed swimming
area into a lake, although the twenty-four by twenty-eight foot
structure had already been built and in use for five years before
the order. When the plaintiffs brought an action to declare that
their use of the structure was legal and proper, the DNR answer
alleged that a criminal citation had been issued against one of
the plaintiffs relating to the same matter and that declaratory
relief was thus unavailable. Citing section 227.15, the court
held that it was the exclusive remedy for review of a DNR order
and the plaintiffs could not circumvent that order by means of
a declaratory judgment. The right to appeal an administrative
ruling is dependent upon strict compliance with chapter 227
and the plaintiffs' failure to appeal the original DNR order
prevented judicial consideration at this point.37 The plaintiffs
had foregone their right to review when they chose to ignore the
original DNR order.
Returning now to the problem as originally posed, whether
cases portend future difficulty in complying with legislative
intent in the amendment of sections 227.15 and 227.16, some
answers may be ferreted out. First, the substitution of
"adversely" for "directly" was intended to provide standing for
public interest groups, as will be discussed at a later point in
this article. Second, the substitution of "substantial interests"
for "legal rights and duties" was intended to broaden the type
of administrative decisions reviewable. The phrase, "whether
by action or inaction," was added for the same reason.
In Pasch, the refusal of the Tax Appeals Commission to
quash the assessment of additional income taxes and to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction was held not to directly affect the legal
rights, duties or privileges of the taxpayer because the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission could be challenged upon review of the
35. Wis. STAT. § 227.05(1) (1975).
36. 77 Wis. 2d 558, 253 N.W.2d 887 (1977).
37. Id. at 568, 253 N.W.2d at 892. The court also determined that the controversy
was not "ripe" because the declaration of rights by the trial court was so tentative and
contingent on DNR action. Id.
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final decision on the merits of the controversy. 8 While it did
not so state, the court was actually applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction and was determining that the administra-
tive agency was the proper forum in which the taxpayer must
proceed at this stage of the controversy. In terms of the present
statutory language, the administrative decision that the
agency had jurisdiction adversely affected the substantial in-
terests of the taxpayer; he was then forced to defend the action
on its merits and expend time and money, on issues which
would be moot if no jurisdiction existed. Turning to the
"commingling of issues" reasoning of the court, the new statute
does not seem to help the taxpayer as much. The court sug-
gested that a taxpayer cannot select one of several issues and
obtain judicial review, because all of the issues constituted only
one proceeding and all issues can be raised on appeal. The
taxpayer was arguing that the assessment was null and void for
want of timeliness. 9 This was not a jurisdictional question and
it is not likely that a Wisconsin court will ever hold a determi-
nation of such an issue immediately reviewable when, as was
the case in this instance, other issues remained to be decided
(i.e., the reasonableness of the interest and penalties to be
charged).
The 1977 Friends of the Earth case" would fare no better
under the new statute. The "Friends of the Earth" organiza-
tion relied upon Pasch for the proposition that immediate
judicial review is available where it is shown that irreparable
harm will result unless judicial relief is granted."1 A careful
reading of Pasch discloses, however, that the only reference
to "irreparable injury" was in a quotation from Columbia
System v. United States,4 2 and the Pasch court reached its
result primarily on the basis of the language of the statute in
effect at that time, not upon a finding of irreparable injury.
Despite this, the court in Friends of the Earth proceeded to
analyze the Public Service Commission (PSC) order in terms
of possible irreparable injury and found that the claimed harm
to the environment was too remote.
38. 58 Wis. 2d at 357, 206 N.W.2d at 162.
39. Id. at 358, 206 N.W.2d at 163.
40. 78 Wis. 2d 388, 254 N.W.2d 299 (1977).
41. Id. at 409, 254 N.W.2d at 307.
42. 316 U.S. 407 (1942), quoted at 58 Wis. 2d at 356, 206 N.W.2d at 162.
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Assuming that "Friends of the Earth" has standing to ob-
tain judicial review of a PSC order granting interim rate relief
to a gas and electric utility, the new review statute would
clearly not require irreparable injury in order for an adminis-
trative decision to be reviewable. The use of the reasoning by
which "Wisconsin's Environmental Decade" was found to have
standing in a recent case 4 is helpful to show that an agency
decision adversely affects the substantial interests of a public
interest organization. Allegation of injury to aesthetic, conser-
vational or recreational interests is sufficient to confer stand-
ing' and should be sufficient to constitute adverse effect of
substantial interests. In any event, irreparable injury as a pre-
requisite to judicial review of an agency decision should no
longer be required.
Thus, when the Wisconsin court is faced with the review
issues exemplified by the Pasch and Friends of the Earth cases
under the present statutory language, and the reasoning must
fit under the broader statute, the results should differ. More-
over, if the court places any weight on the legislative intent as
interpreted by the Judicial Council notes on the original bill,
additional reasons will be found to expand the class of adminis-
trative decisions now reviewable. Whether this would be prefer-
able as a policy matter is debatable, depending upon the view-
point of the particular party to the administrative matter. The
ultimate issue is whether to accord agencies more autonomy in
their decisions, i.e., whether the judicial branch should transfer
power downward in the interest of expediency. If judicial work-
load continues to be a prime factor in policy decisions, as it
seems to be in many areas of the law, courts will continue to
require complete exhaustion of the administrative processes
before review is obtainable. 5
B. Standing
In the above discussion, the question of standing was ig-
nored. Standing, however, is fundamental and its absence is an
43. Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Ser. Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 1,
230 N.W.2d 243 (1975).
44. Id. at 10, 230 N.W.2d at 248.
45. Decisions under the new statute are being handed down by trial courts, of
course. In Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. Public Serv. Comm'n, No. 156-372
(Dane Cir. Ct., Sept. 26, 1977) the Dane County Circuit Court held a decision not to
investigate was not reviewable.
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insurmountable obstacle to judicial review. 6 A major case in
the development of the law of standing to appeal administra-
tive decisions is Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission,4 7 which involved the standing of a
nonprofit, nonstock corporation engaged in public interest ac-
tivities to obtain review of a PSC order placing limitations on
the sale of natural gas by the Wisconsin Public Service Corpo-
ration.
The court observed that the Wisconsin rule of standing en-
visions a two-step analysis conceptually similar to that re-
quired under the federal rule: (1) Does the decision of the
agency directly cause injury to the interest of the petitioner?
(2) Is the interest asserted recognized by law?48 Concluding
that the law of standing should not be construed narrowly or
restrictively,49 and noting carefully that Wisconsin's Environ-
mental Decade (WED) petition alleged that three of its mem-
bers were natural gas customers in the geographical area af-
fected,0 the court found that WED was within the broad zone
of protected interests under the Wisconsin Environmental Pro-
tection Act, the weapon relied upon by WED to oppose the
administrative order.
With respect to the first step in the analysis, the question
of whether under the 1971 language of the statute the agency
decision directly affected WED, the court easily provided an
affirmative answer. Rejecting the argument of the Public Serv-
ice Commission that the alleged injuries were too speculative
or remote, the court held that the series of events which would
be initiated by the agency action would be sufficient to justify
the conclusion that the order of the agency directly caused
injury to the petitioner WED. Remoteness of time between the
injury and the sequence of events set in motion by the agency
action being challenged should not be determinative in the
question of standing." The court's construction of the statute
is as broad in this regard as is possible under the statutory
language.
46. On standing, generally, see DAviS, A mNIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 22.00-22.21
(Supp. 1970). Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970).
47. 69 Wis. 2d 1, 230 N.W. 2d 243 (1975).
48. Id. at 10, 230 N.W.2d at 248.
49. Id. at 13, 230 N.W.2d at 249.
50. Id. at 15, 230 N.W.2d at 250.
51. Id. at 14, 230 N.W.2d at 250.
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The explanatory notes adopted by the Wisconsin Judicial
Council to accompany the text of the bill amending the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act point out that the intent was to include
public interest groups as parties having standing under section
227.15: "The word 'adversely' is substituted for the word
'directly' to avoid the semantic quibble over standing through
public interest groups."52 If the Council had the case before it
when the amendment of the statute was being contemplated,
the amendment might not have been deemed to be necessary.
The statute does not seem to enlarge upon the law of the case.
As previously noted in this article, the substitution of
"adversely" for "directly" does not necessarily expand the
class of persons referred to in section 227.15, which specifies
what orders are reviewable. In any event, to qualify for judicial
review, not only must the order be reviewable under section
227.15, but the appellant must be within the class of persons
stated in section 227.16:
227.16 Parties and proceedings for review. (1) Except
as otherwise specifically provided by law, any person ag-
grieved by a decision specified in s. 227.15 shall be entitled
to judicial review thereof as provided in this chapter.53
Prior to the 1975 amendments, this statute included the
requirement that the "person aggrieved" be "directly affected"
by the decision for it to be reviewed. 4 The Judicial Council was
clear in its reasons for eliminating the language, "directly af-
fected." In its note to section 227.01(6), which defined "party"
as "[a]ny person whose substantial interests may be adversely
affected by any proposed agency action, 5 5 the Council stated:
The purpose of this definition is to indicate a very broad basis
for standing in administrative proceedings. It is intended to
follow the direction of recent federal cases under the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act in broadening the concept of
52. 1975 Wis. Assembly Bill 163, Judicial Council Note, enacted in 1975 Wis. Laws,
ch. 414. Senate Bill 180, being considered in the current legislative session, would
provide an assistant attorney general as "people's utility counsel" in PSC utility rate
cases. Consumers would theoretically have a spokesman with expertise to match utility
experts in rate proceedings. This is the goal of the public interest organizaions which
have recently been appearing in rate cases.
53. Wis. STAT. § 227.16 (1975).
54. Wis. STAT. § 227.16 (1973).
55. Wis. STAT. § 227.01(6) (1975).
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standing and to establish the right of the attorney general or
any agency to party status upon request."
Expanding the class of persons having standing during the
proceedings of an administrative agency does not necessarily
also expand the class eligible to obtain judicial review if it is
true that access to the judiciary is strictly limited by statute.
It must be kept in mind that the question in many instances
is not whether a party will ever attain judicial review, for it is
likely that there will be only a few instances in which some sort
of judicial review will not eventually be obtainable. A crucial
question in many cases, including those already discussed
herein, is the timing of the review. If the time and expense of
a lengthy administrative proceeding can be avoided by judicial
determination that such proceeding is unwarranted or unneces-
sary, this is, of course, preferable. On the other hand, courts
will not countenance constant interruption of administrative
proceedings and a shifting back and forth between the agencies
and the courts.57
Turning now to the second of the two steps in the Wisconsin
rule for determining standing as espoused in the 1975
Environmental Decade case,58 a seemingly broader analysis is
warranted. If the decision of the agency directly causes injury
to the petitioner ("adversely" affects under present statutory
language), is the interest asserted recognized by law? In the
Environmental Decade case the environmental group asserted
that the use of dirty fuels by lower priority customers was a
violation of the Wisconsin Environmental Protection Act and
WED's interest in preventing such use should be legally recog-
nized under the Wisconsin rule for determining standing. 9
Since this was a case of first impression, WED cited the naviga-
ble waters public trust doctrine as precedent." The court
56. 1975 Wis. Assembly Bill 163, Judicial Council Note, enacted in 1975 Wis. Laws
ch. 414. The federal Administrative Procedure Act differs from the language chosen
by the Judicial Council: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
57. This is the argument made in City of West Allis v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 268, 240 N.W.2d 416 (1976). See note 23, supra.
58. 69 Wis. 2d at 10, 230 N.W.2d at 248. See text accompanying note 48, supra.
59. Id. at 14, 230 N.W.2d at 250.
60. Daley v. Natural Resources Bd., 60 Wis. 2d 208, 208 N.W.2d 839 (1973); Just
v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Muench v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
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doubted that the Environmental Protection Act established a
public trust comparable to that created in navigable waters,
but did concede that the legislative intent was comprehensive
and that any person residing in the area most likely to be
affected by the agency action might be sufficiently affected to
have a legally protectable interest." Having adopted this logic,
the finding of standing for the organization was assured.
Under the present statutory language, a court must still
determine whether the interest asserted by the party seeking
judicial review is of a species warranting the attention of the
courts, but the language of the test should track the statute.
Having eliminated the necessity of determining the immediacy
or proximity of the effect of the agency decision, the statute
now requires that "substantial" interests should be adversely
affected for judicial review to be in order. In its explanatory
notes, the Judicial Council argued that although the amend-
ment was intended to broaden the class of persons having
standing by use of the phrase "substantial interests are ad-
versely affected,""2 it was also intended that the aggrieved per-
son suffer some injury, however slight.6 3 Thus, the issue of
standing is to be resolved in favor of the party seeking review,
whenever possible.
Referring now to the specific words of the statute, the 1975
amendments greatly simplified the test. To have standing for
review, all that need be shown is that the person is aggrieved
by the administrative decision; it need not be shown that the
person was directly affected by such decision. The definitions
section further clarifies the statute: "A 'person aggrieved' in-
cludes any person or agency whose substantial interests are
adversely affected by a determination of an agency." 4 Quite
obviously, the legislative intent was to broaden standing for
judicial review.
A number of decisions had occasion to interpret the term
"person aggrieved." In the Pasch case, already discussed, the
taxpayer was held not to be an aggrieved party.65 Nor was an
agency official an aggrieved party merely because of his inter-
61. 69 Wis. 2d at 18, 230 N.W.2d at 252.
62. Wis. STAT. § 227.15 (1975).
63. 1975 Wis. Assembly Bill 163, Judicial Council Note, enacted it. 1975 Wis. Laws,
ch. 414.
64. Wis. STAT. § 227.01(8) (1975).
65. 58 Wis. 2d at 357, 206 N.W.2d at 163.
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est in seeing his decision upheld in court when the agency
board reversed him. 6 A financial interest which is only remote
is insufficient to create aggrieved party status."7 Conversely, a
town was held to be an aggrieved party for review of a sewage
treatment plan approved by the State Board of Health where
the proposed facility might have polluted a lake in the town."
Also, a town was an aggrieved party for purposes of review of
an order by the Public Service Commission denying the town
the right to build a bulkhead line (behind which swampy land
could be filled in) in a river.69
Prior to the enactment of a definition of aggrieved party in
section 227.01(8), the Wisconsin court relied upon the judicial
definition contained in Greenfield v. Joint County School
Commission.70 An aggrieved party was "one having an interest
recognized by law in the subject matter which is injuriously
affected by the judgment." Under this test, the Pasch court
found no standing for the taxpayer appealing his income tax
assessment. However, it would seem that the same logic which,
under section 227.15, would allow a court to find that the ad-
ministrative decision was reviewable would also allow a finding
that the taxpayer had standing to pursue that review. A deci-
sion by an agency that it has jurisdiction in a disputed matter
certainly adversely affects the substantial interests of the party
who must now adjudicate the merits of the matter before the
agency prior to obtaining judicial review of the jurisdictional
question. At any rate, this result apparently coincided with the
expressed legislative intent, as indicated in the Judicial Coun-
cil notes. 2
66. Mortenson v. Pyramid Say. & Loan Ass'n, 53 Wis. 2d 81, 191 N.W.2d 730
(1971).
67. Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 45 Wis. 2d 253, 172
N.W.2d 639 (1969).
68. Town of Norway v. State Bd. of Health, 32 Wis. 2d 362, 369-70, 145 N.W.2d
790, 794 (1966). The town board had passed a resolution pursuant to Wis. STAT. §
60.18(12) (1961) authorizing it to exercise the powers of a village board, which included
the right to manage and control navigable water.
69. Town of Ashwaubenon v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 38, 47-48, 125
N.W.2d 647, 652, reh. denied, 22 Wis. 2d 55a, 126 N.W.2d 567 (1964).
70. 271 Wis. 442, 73 N.W.2d 580 (1955).
71. Id. at 447, 73 N.W.2d at 583.
72. 1975 Wis. Assembly Bill 163, Judicial Council Note, enacted in 1975 Wis. Laws
ch. 414, § 5.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although standing to appeal administrative decisions will
probably continue to be liberally interpreted, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court does not seem willing to expand the class of
decisions subject to judicial review. The court demonstrates no
inclination to allow utilization of common law judicial reme-
dies, nor does it construe the statutory authority liberally. If
there is no clear intent on the part of the legislature to permit
judicial review of a particular type of administrative decision,
the court usually finds that the judicial system has no jurisdic-
tion in the matter. The doctrines of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies and primary jurisdiction are frequently relied
upon to retain the matter within the agency adjudication until
a later time in the proceeding. While adhering to the doctrine
of eventual judicial review of all administrative matters, the
court prefers that the agency adjudicate the merits of the con-
troversy before review is permitted.
This tendency may seem harsh to those who believe that the
adjudicatory skills of the judicial branch of government are
vastly superior to those of the administrative branch. The
harshness is magnified in the case of an agency which may
often be arbitrary in its quasi-judicial decisions. It may be time
consuming and expensive to be required to defend administra-
tive action to a point in the proceedings where it is determined
that the agency had no jurisdiction or that some other basic
threshold issue should have been decided in favor of a party
earlier. However, the alternative, earlier or easier access to the
courts, is not particularly attractive, assuming that the matter
will progress more slowly in the courts and at a greater expense.
This propensity for discouraging immediate access to the
courts does, of course, result in administrative agencies gaining
more power and discretion in adjudication. That this has been
the trend since the inception of the administrative law system
is not to be denied, nor is it necessarily reprehensible. What is
unfortunate is the fact that there is a complete segregation of
the administrative and judicial branches of government and
this results in waste of time and resources in appealing from
the lower to the higher branch. If the party aggrieved were to
obtain a day in court at the lower level of proceedings, constitu-
tional issues could be avoided and the citizenry would be much
more likely to be satisfied with the result, even if unfavorable.
When the agency is the lesser branch of government, and the
[Vol. 61:405
19781 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 423
court has the final word in the matter, satisfaction with agency
decision-making is not possible in many, if not most, instances.
Some type of fusion, perhaps a merger, might solve this
conceptual problem. When administrative agencies are given
full judicial rather than quasi-judicial powers, many of the
problems addressed in this article will evaporate. However, the
legislatures of the several states are not predisposed in this
direction. In fact, the trend is to further refine the procedural
techniques with which a case moves from one separate branch
of government to another, higher branch, thus further reinforc-
ing the differentiation.
As has been indicated, the intent of the Wisconsin legisla-
ture was to broaden the class of cases reviewable, at least if the
Judicial Council notes are representative of that intent. The
most recent Wisconsin cases view accessibility to review quite
strictly and one wonders whether the legislative intent will
greatly influence the court if it is found that the statutory
language itself is not ambiguous. For example, it has been
argued in this article that the substitution of "substantial in-
terests" for "legal rights, duties or privileges" replaces a nar-
row, unambiguous term with a broad term capable of a wide
variety of interpretations. If a reviewing judge determines that
"substantial interests" is as ambiguous a term as it seems to
be, it can be argued that the legislative history should be con-
sulted. Contrarily, the judge has the prerogative to find that
the meaning of the term is clear as applied to the facts of the
case and the legislative history then becomes irrelevant. These
alternatives are and should be within the authority of the judi-
cial branch.
In attempting to predict the future, it is to be hoped that
the Wisconsin court may be persuaded to somewhat expand
the scope of the statute to encompass administrative decisions
not previously reviewable. However, it is probable that in the
vast majority of cases the court will continue to refuse to review
until the administrative body has reached a result on the mer-
its. This, after all, is the result most likely to save the litigant
time and expense in most instances.

